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par

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AFRIQUE DU SUD

1. **Crossing the floor : the judgment**. *Local Government Law Bulletin*. Vol. 4, no 4 (November 2002)
   http://www.communitylawcentre.org.za/localgov/bulletin2002/2002_4_crossing_p1.php

   « On 4 October the Constitutional Court ended a period of political instability that started just less than a year ago with the break up of the Democratic Alliance (DA). The eagerly awaited judgment of the Court declared as constitutional the Acts that relate to crossing the floor at local government level, namely the Local Government : Municipal Structures Amendment Act 20 of 2002 and the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Amendment Act 18 of 2002. The content of these Acts was discussed in LGL Bulletin 2002 (2) 1-3. However, the Court declared invalid the Acts that relate to national and provincial legislatures, namely Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Amendment Act 21 of 2002 and the Loss or Retention of Membership of National and Provincial Legislatures Act 22 of 2002. This article discusses United Democratic Movement v The President of the Republic of South Africa and others Case CCT 23/02, insofar as it deals with local government. It also outlines the Court's reasons for striking down the legislation with regard to provincial and national legislatures. »

2. Olaleye, Wole. **An assessment of the legislative framework for political party coalition in South Africa**. Johannesburg : Electoral Institute of Southern Africa, 2003. 12 p.
   http://www.eisa.org.za/PDF/ppr_saleg.pdf

   « This paper is an exploratory attempt that seeks to analyze South African Constitution from the perspective of coalition and its interplay with the electoral system, political party policy, and parliamentary procedures. The analyses show that South Africa Constitution is silent on regulation guiding coalition politics. However, the recent amendment to the Membership Bill of national and provincial legislatures provides a glimpse into the partial legal framework guiding party coalition in South Africa. »

3. Republic of South Africa. Gauteng Province. Legislature. **Announcements, tablings and committee reports : Friday, 5 June 1998**. Johannesburg : Gauteng Legislature, 1998. 10 p.
   http://www.gautengleg.gov.za/Publish/Parliament%20Documents/Archive_House%20Documents/Archive_%20First%20Parliament/Atc/1998/1998-06-05-c.066.pdf

   « MP who ceases to be a member of the party who had nominated him or her, could retain membership of a legislature, and if so, under what

circumstances. In other words, should a member who is expelled from his or her party or who wants to « cross the floor », be allowed to retain membership of a legislature, and if so, under what circumstances? »

BÉLIZE

4. **The Legislature : crossing the floor : an anti-defection law**. In *Final report of the Political Reform Commission*. Belmopan : Government of Belize, 2000. http://www.belize.gov.bz/library/political_reform/p9.html

   Chap. 9.
   « In discussions related to the Cabinet and to the power of recall above, the Commission noted its position that anti-defection legislation be considered in Belize. This is in line with public concern over their representatives moving to another party between elections and so nullifying their desired vote. Additionally, the Commission examined the issue from the point of view that crossing the floor can result in a change of government and even result in new elections. »

BRÉSIL

5. Desposato, Scott W. **The impact of party-switching on legislative behavior in Brazil**. [S.l.] : Scott W. Desposato, 2004. 26 p.
   http://dss.ucsd.edu/~sdesposa/ps2.pdf

   « In this paper, I examine the impact of party-switching on legislator's roll-call votes in Brazil. About one-third of deputies change party during each four year term; some change as many as seven times. Such volatility challenges basic concepts of representation - if legislators change their policy positions to accommodate their new party, they violate the basic utility of party labels for electoral information cost reduction. This research has an additional utility. Legislative scholars agree that political parties are important parts of modern democracy, but roll-call based measures of party influence cannot separate out the influence of legislators own preferences and party directives. Analyzing the behavior of switchers before and after they change party gives us leverage on this and the ongoing « do parties matter » debates. I find significant and consistent party effects on legislative behavior, even when controlling for executive influence. »

6. Desposato, Scott W. **Parties for rent? ambition, ideology, and party switching in Brazil's Chamber of Deputies**. Tucson : University of Arizona, Department of Political Science, 2004. 45 p.
   http://dss.ucsd.edu/~sdesposa/ps1.pdf

« Party switching by legislators has been common in many countries, including the Philippines, Italy, Nepal, Ecuador, Russia, and Japan. While frequently dismissed as simply an indicator of weak parties, switching provides a unique window on party systems. To the extent that we understand affiliation decisions, we gain insight on the way politicians use parties to advance their careers. In this paper I offer a model of party membership patterns, where decisions to switch party or to stay put are a function of the strategic interaction of legislators and endogenous party leaders. I test the model on the case of Brazil, where switching is common. Results suggest that Brazilian legislators use parties to maximize pork, ideological consistency, and short-term electoral success, but which of these matters most depends on constituents - i.e., legislators use parties for different purposes in different electoral environments. The approach developed here could easily be applied to study legislative behavior in other political systems. »

CANADA

7. Canada. **Projet de loi C-218 : Loi modifiant la Loi sur le Parlement du Canada**. Ottawa : Chambre des communes du Canada, 2001. 3 p.
http://www.parl.gc.ca/LEGISINFO/index.asp?Lang=F&Chamber=N&StartList=A&EndList=Z&Session=9&Type=0&Scope=I&query=2735&List=toc-1

   Ce projet de loi n'a pas été adopté.
   Première session, 37e législature, 2001.
   « Ce texte prévoit que le siège d'un député devient vacant - cette vacance ayant pour conséquence le déclenchement d'une élection partielle - si le député, déclaré élu à titre de membre d'un parti ou comme député indépendant, change de parti ou devient membre d'un parti, selon le cas, à tout moment de son mandat. Il ne se produit pas de vacance si le député, déclaré a été élu à titre de membre d'un parti, décide de siéger comme député indépendant à tout moment de son mandat. »

8. Canada. **Projet de loi C-251 : Loi modifiant la Loi sur le Parlement du Canada (changement d'appartenance politique)**. Ottawa : Chambre des communes, 2004. 4 p.
http://www.parl.gc.ca/38/1/parlbus/chambus/house/bills/private/C-251/C-251_1/C-251_cover-F.html

   Première session, 38e législature, 2004-2005.

9. Canada. **Projet de loi C-408 : Loi modifiant la Loi sur le Parlement du Canada (changement d'appartenance politique)**. Ottawa : Chambre des communes, 2005. 4 p.
http://www.parl.gc.ca/LEGISINFO/index.asp?Lang=F&Chamber=N&StartList=A&EndList=Z&Session=13&Type=0&Scope=1&query=4525&List=toc-1

Première session, 38e législature, 2004-2005.

10. Canada. Chambre des communes. **Débats de la Chambre des communes, le lundi 19 novembre 2001**. Ottawa : Chambre des communes, 2001. 10 p.
Également disponible à l'adresse électronique
http://www.parl.gc.ca/common/Chamber_House_Debates_load.asp?Language=F&Parl=37&Ses=1&Dte=114_2001-11-19-F

Vol. 137, no 114, 1re session, 37e législature.

11. Canada. Parlement. Chambre des communes. Comité permanent de la procédure et des affaires de la Chambre. Sous-comité des affaires émanant des députés. **Témoignages, le mercredi 21 novembre 2001**. Ottawa : Chambre des communes, 2001. 38 p.

http://www.parl.gc.ca/committee/CommitteePublication.aspx?SourceId=55766

Voir les pages 6-9.
Témoignages lors de l'étude du projet de loi C-218 : Loi modifiant la Loi sur le Parlement du Canada.

ÉQUATEUR

12. Mejía-Acosta, Andrés. **Explaining « camisetazos » : the logic of party switching in the Ecuadorian Congress (1979 – 1996)**. Notre Dame, IN : University of Notre Dame, 1999. 19 p.
http://www.nd.edu/~amejiaac/psw.pdf

« This paper tries to explain the causes of party switching in the Ecuadorian Congress from 1979 until 1996. It is estimated that an average of 11.96% of congressmen have switched from their parties (choosing to join another party or remain independent) in every legislative period. This common phenomena in Ecuadorian politics, also known as « camisetazo » or change of shirt, is perceived by politicians and voters alike as an expected feature of legislative behavior that does not undermine the individual reputation of the switcher. In analyzing legislative politics in Latin America, some authors have offered useful insights to understanding levels of party-switching, party cohesion and the formation of coalitions in the fragmented Brazilian

Congress. There are no studies that have tested their hypothesis in a neighbor context. This paper tries to address such lacuna by analyzing the electoral, ideological and institutional causes of party switching in Ecuador. »

ESPAGNE

13. Mershon, Carol; Heller, William B. **Party switching and political careers in the Spanish Congress of Deputies, 1982-1996**. [S.l.] : William B. Heller, 2003. 41 p.
http://bingweb.binghamton.edu/~wheller/quorum/papers/hellermershon_mpsa2003.pdf

Paper prepared for presentation at the 2003 Annual Meetings of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL, April 3-6, 2003.
« This paper breaks new ground by focusing on the question of the consequences of party switching among legislators and candidates for legislative office. Yet we by no means ignore the causes of switching. Indeed, we stress that, to the extent that politicians exercise rational foresight, the incentives to switch parties are logically connected to the consequences of switching. For example, ambitious politicians can be expected to migrate to parties that, for various reasons, offer them relatively high prospects of electoral success; thus, the expected effect of switching should be electoral gain. Whether that sort of expectation is realized is a key empirical issue that we examine. To lay the basis for the investigation, the second section of this paper highlights the importance of party labels in democratic politics and considers the extant theoretical and empirical literature on party switching. The argument we advance in the third section both builds on, and moves beyond, the research conducted to date. More than many analysts, we emphasize the interdependence of politicians' decisions. As already indicated, further, we specify connections between the motivations for, and results of, party switching. The fourth section of the paper assesses changes of party affiliation among candidates for, and legislators in, the Spanish lower house between 1982 and 1996. We find, among other things, that party-hopping MPs are slightly less likely to win reelection than MPs who stick with their original parties. This result fits with the judgment that party switching by elected officials deserves the opprobrium of society. »

ÉTATS-UNIS

14. Yoshinaka, Antoine. **Party switching among incumbent Southern state legislators, 1980-2003**. Chicago : Midwest Political Science Association, 2004. 28 p.

http://archive.allacademic.com/publication/getfile.php?file=docs/mpsa_proceeding/2004-04-13/24133/mpsa_proceeding_24133.pdf&PHPSESSID=5c199d3a4114856cd5d64eb1d4550966

Paper prepared for delivery at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL, April 15-18, 2004.
« What factors lead to the occurrence of party switching in state legislatures? While the study of party switching at the congressional level is a burgeoning field, the topic has rarely been examined at other levels of government. This paper offers a systematic aggregate analysis of party switching among incumbent state legislators in the South from 1980 to 2003. The results show that the incidence of party switching rises with increases in environmental stress associated with political, institutional, and economic shocks. Findings from this paper will be of interest to students of state politics, parties, and elections. »

15. Choate, Judd. **Torn and frayed : congressional norms and party switching in an era of reform**. Westport, Conn. : Praeger, 2003. 176 p.
JK1319 C46 2003 Biblio. Un. McGill

« Members come and go, reforms are attempted and abandoned, but congressional norms of seniority, specialization, and reciprocity adapt, survive, and continue to influence the course of American government. In the first major look at congressional normative behavior in 25 years, Choate argues these resilient folkways survive because members value the institutional stability and continuity they provide. »

16. Grose, Christian R. **Is it better to join the majority? The electoral effects of party switching by Southern State Legislators, 1972-2000**. *American Review of Politics*. Vol. 25 (Spring/Summer 2004). P. 79-98

17. Grose, Christian R.; Yoshinaka, Antoine. **The electoral consequences of party switching by incumbent members of Congress**. *Legislative Studies Quarterly*. Vol. 28, no 1 (February 2003). P. 55-75

« What are the electoral consequences of switching parties for incumbent members of Congress? Do incumbents who switch fare better or worse after their switch? Aldrich (1995) and Aldrich and Bianco (1992) present a model of party affiliation for all candidates. We empirically extend this model for *incumbent* legislators who have switched parties in order to find out if they face electoral costs after they switch. We look at the universe of incumbent representatives who have run for Congress under more than one party label since World War II, finding that the primary and general election vote shares for party switchers after their switch are not as high as the vote shares before their switch. Additionally, the switch causes the primaries in the switcher's party and the opposing party (the switcher's « old » party) to

become more competitive in the short run. Over the long run, however, primaries in the switcher's new party are less competitive than in the old party's primaries before the switch. »

18. Hatcher, Andrea C.; Oppenheimer, Bruce I. **Congressional party switchers, 1876-2003 : the effects of party and constituency on strategic behavior**. Bloomington, IN : Midwest Political Science Association, 2003. 29 p. http://mpsa.indiana.edu/conf2003papers/1031602294.pdf

    « This paper examines the changing voting behavior of party switchers within institutional contexts of party polarization and major versus mixed major-minor party systems in order to explore whether party in government or party in the electorate affects the change in roll call voting observed among party switchers. That members' roll call votes change post-switch speaks to the far-reaching influence of parties in congressional voting behavior. Still, some contend that the change in roll call scores of party switchers is their response to a new reelection constituency and not to the constraints of party organization in Congress. This paper addresses that challenge with interview data from party switchers who speak nearly unanimously about the influence of party structuring in Congress. We offer a refined list of congressional party switchers from 1876-2003. This list allows us to analyze data on party switchers within a wider range of contexts in order to relate the change in roll call voting behavior to the extent of polarization of congressional parties as well as the availability of third parties at the time of the switch. Most importantly, we reinforce the centrality of party, not ideology or constituency, in party switching and resulting voting behavior. »

19. Nokken, Timothy P. **Dynamics of congressional loyalty : party defection and roll call behavior, 1947-1997**. *Legislative Studies Quarterly*. Vol. 25, no 3 (August 2000). P. 417-444

    « I seek to determine whether or not political parties have significant independent effects upon the roll-call behavior of their members. Taking advantage of a natural experiment, I analyze the roll-call behavior of those members of the House and Senate from 1947 to 1997 who changed party affiliation while in office. Using data from the 80th to 105th Congresses, I find that Democrats who become Republicans, for instance, start to vote like Republicans at the time they "cross aisles." This finding is consistent with the claims made in a growing literature that emphasizes the partisan aspects of congressional organization, and it supports the contention that party plays a direct role in determining members' roll-call behavior. »

20. Nokken, Timothy P. **Party switching and the procedural party agenda in the US House of Representatives, 1953 – 2002**. Charlottesville, VA : Party Switching Research Group, 2005. 30 p.

http://faculty.virginia.edu/partyswitching/papers/cv05-nokken.pdf

« This paper builds on past analyses of the roll call behavior of party switchers in the United States Congress (Nokken, 2000; Nokken and Poole, 2004) to investigate how party affiliation constrains members' roll call behavior. Previous studies utilized aggregate roll call indexes to conclude party switchers exhibit statistically significant shifts in their roll call behavior at the time they switch parties. Significant behavioral changes resulting from party switching, though, tend to be concentrated in periods of high ideological polarization. In this paper, I calculate DW-NOMINATE scores for switchers and non-switchers on important subsets of roll call votes : final passage, amendment, and procedural votes. I hypothesize that party switchers should exhibit the greatest changes in procedural and amendment votes, and may exhibit little or no significant behavioral changes on final passage votes. My analyses show that while most switchers make noticeable changes in votes on final passage, larger changes tend to occur on amendment and procedural votes. »

21. Nokken, Timothy P.; Poole, Keith T. **Congressional party defection in American history**. [S.l.] : Keith T. Poole, 2001. 29 p.
http://voteview.com/nokken_poole.pdf

Paper prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, August 29 to September 2, 2001. « In this paper, we analyze the roll call voting behavior of those House and Senate members who changed their party affiliation during the course of their political career. We analyze members who switched during the stable periods of the three major twoparty systems in American history : the Federalist-Jeffersonian Republican system (3rd to 12th Congresses), the Democratic-Whig System (20th to 30th Congresses), and the Democratic-Republican System (46th to 106th Congresses). Our primary finding is that the biggest changes in the roll call voting behavior of party defectors is observed during periods of high ideological polarization, and that party defections of the past 30 years are distinct from switches in other eras due both to high polarization and the disappearance of a second dimension of ideological conflict. »

22. Ross, William G. **Should senators who switch parties be removed from office or compelled to resign?** Pittsburgh : Jurist, 2001. 7 p.
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forum/forumnew24.htm

« Although members of Congress are under no legal obligation to honor promises that they make to their constituents during election campaigns, a change in partisan affiliation breaks faith with voters more profoundly than does a change on any pending legislation or policy position. A congressional candidate's appearance on the ballot under a particular party label constitutes a tacit pledge that the candidate will help that party organize

control in the chamber of Congress to which he or she is elected. While voters understand that changed circumstances may cause a member of Congress to alter his or her position on a particular issue, party affiliations are presumed to be more enduring. »

23. Yoshinaka, Antoine. **Congressional party switchers and committee assignments : who gets what, when, how?** Ottawa : Association canadienne de science politique, 2003. 23 p.
http://cpsa-acsp.ca/paper-2003/yoshinaka.pdf

Paper prepared for delivery at the 2003 meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia, May 30-June 1.
« What are the consequences of party switching for members of Congress? While the roll-call consequences and the electoral consequences of congressional party switching have previously been studied, other consequences of party defections have yet to be systematically explored. In this paper, I examine the committee assignments of House party switchers and argue that party leaders seek to reward members of the opposing party who join their ranks. Using committee assignment data from the 94th House (1975-76) through the 107th House (2001- 02), I show that party switchers were more likely than non-switchers to be the beneficiaries of violations of the seniority norm. Findings from this paper will be of interest to scholars of parties and Congress, and fill a gap in the literature on party switching. »

ÉTUDES GÉNÉRALES OU COMPARATIVES

24. Laver, Michael; Benoit, Kenneth. **The evolution of party systems between elections**. *American Journal of Political Science*. Vol. 47, no 2 (April 2003). P. 215-233

« Most existing theoretical work on party competition pays little attention to the evolution of party systems between elections as a result of defections between parties. In this article, we treat individual legislators as utility-maximizing agents tempted to defect to other parties if this would increase their expected payoffs. We model the evolution of party systems between elections in these terms and discuss this analytically, exploring unanswered questions using computational methods. Under office-seeking motivational assumptions, our results strikingly highlight the role of the largest party, especially when it is « dominant » in the technical sense, as a pole of attraction in interelectoral evolution. »

25. Malhotra, G. C. **Communication from Mr G.C. Malhotra on anti-defection law**. In *Minutes of the Spring session, Mexico City, 19-23 April 2004*. Genève : Union interparlementaire, Association of Secretaries General of Parliaments, 2004. P. 99-116, 140

http://www.asgp.info/documents/plenary_minutes_mexico_2004.pdf

« This Paper aims to throw some light on the experiences and the laws and rules relating to defections in some of the Commonwealth Parliaments. While efforts have been made to make the paper comprehensive, it is not exhaustive because of constraints of time and availability of information. The information was collected during the last few years and hence it may be dated in some cases. Any correction or updating of information by the concerned authorities will be highly appreciated and gratefully acknowledged. Out of the 52 Commonwealth (National) Parliaments, which were requested to provide information relating to political defections and anti-defection laws, if any, in their countries, 34 responded and supplied the information. Out of them, 25 Parliaments have been found to have experienced political defections. While 18 of the 34 Parliaments which responded have framed laws to deal with defections, 16 have not framed such laws and rules and they tackle such cases with the help of usual practices, procedures and conventions. »

26. Mershon, Carol; Shvetsova, Olga. **Electoral cycles and party switching : opportunistic partisan realignment in legislatures**. Tucson : International Studies Association, 2005. 46 p.
http://archive.allacademic.com/publication/getfile.php?file=docs/isa_proceeding/2005-02-28/59268/isa_proceeding_59268.pdf&PHPSESSID=3142ea35506a351672f9ce55f434ebed

Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association Hilton Hawaiian Village, Honolulu, Hawaii, 2005-03-05.
« In this paper, we view party strategy as fitting the compound imperatives of the entire political business cycle - from one election to the next - and focus on the legislative stage of that cycle. To the extent to which one can assume the autonomy of the legislative-stage objectives for the players (and we discuss instances when that is indeed the case), we seek to identify the parliamentary switching strategy, which emerges as a response to those objectives. For the cases of Italy and Russia, we locate actors in parliaments whose legislative-stage optimization problem can be analyzed in isolation from that of the electoral stage. For those players, we show the presence of behavior consistent with the non-electoral objectives (hunting the core of policy space). That behavior is manifested in the pattern of switching parties; it amounts to and, we argue, aims at amending the definition of the party system in parliament relative to the electoral outcome. While we look for similarities between our two cases for the legislative-stage model and data, when we expand our analysis to include the full business cycle we highlight a key contrast that we attribute to differences in institutional details, in the age of the democratic regimes, and thus in the information available to electorates. Specifically, the long-term consequences of

strategic legislative switching in Italy seem to contribute to the overall development and consolidation of a new (post-1994) party system, whereas in Russia legislative realignment is counter-productive for party development, remains of tactical significance, and follows a strictly cyclical pattern. »

27. Miskin, Sarah. **Politician overboard : jumping the party ship**. Canberra : Parliament of Australia, Department of the Parliamentary Library, 2003. 48 p. (Research paper : 4 2002-03)
http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/rp/2002-03/03RP04.htm

« This paper is not concerned with those politicians who move to another party and surrender their seats when doing so. Nor is it concerned with those who are in parliament under one party's banner and are re-elected at some later date under another party's banner. That is, those who change affiliation outside parliament. In addition, this paper is not concerned with « crossing the floor »; a separate, forthcoming Department of the Parliamentary Library publication will deal with crossing the floor and its consequences for a politician. Rather, the focus is on the instances in which politicians quit their parties to sit as independents or join another party while retaining the seat to which they were elected. This is known in much of the literature and media commentary as « jumping the party ship » or party jumping. Section 1 examines defections in general, discussing the following questions : why do so few politicians defect? Why do politicians choose to abandon their parties and how do they justify keeping their seats when doing so? Who has the « right » to the seat : the party or the politician? What are the consequences of jumping for politicians in terms of both their post-defection behaviour and their chances of re-election? Section 2 discusses attempts to legislate against party switching in Papua New Guinea, India, South Africa and New Zealand. It argues that such legislation may be effective in resolving Papua New Guinea's debilitating problem with defections, but elsewhere such law has proved to be problematic at best and unworkable at worst. The paper concludes by suggesting that, although politicians quitting the party while keeping their seats may raise the ire of both the party and voters, attempting to control such defections through legislation is not a sensible option. »

28. Rossignol, Michel. **Les transfuges à la Chambre et le système de parti**. Ottawa : Bibliothèque du Parlement, Service de recherche, 1987. 27 p. (Étude générale : BP-162F)

GRANDE-BRETAGNE

29. Cowley, Philip. **« Crossing the floor » : representative theory and practice in Britain**. *Public Law*. (Summer 1996). P. 214-224

INDE

30. **Disqualification on ground of defection**. In *Handbook for members of Lok Sabha.* New Delhi : Lok Sabha, 2004. P. 188-191
http://parliamentofindia.nic.in/ls/handbook/chapter5.pdf

31. Jain, C. K. **Les règles relatives au non-respect de la discipline de parti**. *Informations constitutionnelles et parlementaires*. No 165 (1993). P. 64-74

32. Kashyap, Subhash C. **Anti-defection law and parliamentary privileges** . Bombay : N.M. Tripathi Private, 1995. 422 p.
KNS2183 K37 1995 Biblio. Un. McGill

    2e éd. parue en 2003.

33. Rao, D. Sripada. **Anti-defection law : split in parties**. *Journal of Parliamentary Information*. Vol. 39, no 1 (1993). P. 99-106

    Biblio. Un. McGill

34. Sarwar, Ghulam. **Anti-defection law : problems and prospects**. *Journal of Parliamentary Information*. Vol. 39, no 1 (1993). P. 107-112

    Biblio. Un. McGill

35. Tripathi, Keshari Nath. **Anti-defection law**. *Journal of Parliamentary Information*. Vol. 39, no 1 (1993). P. 129-137

    Biblio. Un. McGill

ITALIE

36. Heller, William B.; Mershon, Carol. **Dealing in discipline : party switching and legislative voting in the Italian Chamber of Deputies, 1988-2000**. [S.l.] : William B. Heller, 2004. 38 p.
http://bingweb.binghamton.edu/~wheller/quorum/papers/cw2vrr10.pdf

    « Compared to US political parties, parties in Italy (and Europe generally) are quite cohesive. Rarely do members of parliament vote against their co-partisans in legislative voting. Yet in Italy in recent years legislators switch parties with seeming abandon. Between 1996 and spring 2000, one out of four deputies in the Chamber of Deputies switched parties at least once, compared to only twenty switches in the US Congress in the fifty years from 1947 to 1997 (Nokken 2000). We examine the relationship between switching and observed party unity in Italy by focusing on individual legislators' switching decisions and voting behavior. Overall, switchers

appear to be subject to less party discipline after switching than before, suggesting that they move partly in order to escape strong discipline. »

37. Heller, William B.; Mershon, Carol. **Party switching in the Italian Chamber of Deputies, 1996-2001**. *Journal of Politics*. Vol. 67, no 2 (May 2005). P. 536-559

38. Heller, William B.; Mershon, Carol. **Switching in parliamentary parties : exits and entries in parliamentary groups in the Italian Chamber of Deputies, 1996-2001**. [S.l.] : William B. Heller, 2004. 37 p.
http://bingweb.binghamton.edu/~wheller/quorum/papers/switching-a.pdf

« Almost one-fourth of the members of the lower house in Italy, the Chamber of Deputies, switched parties at least once between 1996 and 2001. Why would a legislator abandon one party and enter another during a legislative term? Starting from the basic assumption that politicians are ambitious, we examine electoral and partisan motivations for members of parliament (MPs) who switch parties. We conclude that party switching most likely is motivated by party labels that provide little information about policy goals and that pit co-partisans against each other in the effort to serve constituent needs. Switching is especially frequent when ambitious politicians operate under heightened uncertainty. »

JAPON

39. Kato, Junko. **When the party breaks up : exit and voice among Japanese legislators**. *American Political Science Review*. Vol. 92, no 4 (December 1998). P. 857-870

40. Kato, Junko; Yamamoto, Kentaro. **Competition for power : party switching as a means for changing party systems in Japan**. Charlottesville, VA : Party Switching Research Group, 2005. 19 p.
http://faculty.virginia.edu/partyswitching/papers/cv05-kato.pdf

Prepared for Party Switching Research Group (PSRG) 10-14 July 2005 Workshop, Charlottesville, VA, U.S.A.
« Since 1993, Japan has experienced party breakups, mergers and the formation of new parties that are rare in industrial democracies. As a result, the one-party dominance by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), with perennial opposition parties, has evolved into a LDP-centered governing coalition faced with the Democratic Party (DP) contending with it for office. While an electoral system change took place at the same time, party switching by legislators has led to a changing balance of power among parties, especially between the LDP and the DP. Especially since 1996, when the first election under a new electoral system took place, both the LDP and the DP have continued to attract switchers from other smaller

parties and to increase their size. The LDP's size has exceeded the threshold for a majority, but the party has not been able to attract a sufficient number of party switchers to achieve a majority that would enable it to pass legislation without allying with other parties. In contrast, the DP has become even more challenging to the LDP. The paper argues that party switchers have different prospects for future party systems. More specifically, switchers to the LDP believe that the LDP will restore one-party dominance to office. The switchers to the DP count on the DP's advantage as a centrist party at the expense of the conservative LDP. The paper demonstrates the possibility that legislators may decide to switch, based on different assumptions of party competition, that is, office-seeking and policy-seeking when the power balance of parties is susceptible to changes. »

41. Reed, Steven R.; Scheiner, Ethan. **Electoral incentives and policy preferences : mixed motives behind party defections in Japan**. *British Journal of Political Science*. Vol. 33, no 3 (July 2003). P. 469-490

« Examining the 1993 split of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in Japan offers an opportunity to gain greater insight into the impact of the various incentives that influence the behaviour of politicians. Surprisingly, previous analyses of the LDP split have been able to demonstrate only weak evidence of any electoral connection driving politicians' decisions. However, by also examining the role of policy preferences (support for reform) and utilizing interaction terms, our analysis takes into account the fact that politicians at different stages in their careers and facing different sorts of electorates respond to electoral factors in very different ways. Our findings thus confirm the importance of the electoral connection. We are also able to add that a variety of other incentives also shape political behaviour and that politicians do not necessarily all respond to similar stimuli in the same way. »

NÉPAL

42. **Strenghtening Nepal's multiparty democracy : party discipline and anti-defection measures : a National Democratic Institute for International Affairs workshop, July 25 to 26, 1997, Kathmandu, Nepal**. Washington, D.C. National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, 1998. 83 p. http://www.accessdemocracy.org/library/220_np_strengthening.pdf

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43. **Electoral (Integrity) Amendment Act 2001**. In *New Zealand statutes 2001*. Wellington : New Zealand Government, 2002. P. 2199-2204
349.310822 N934 2001 3

PARLEMENT EUROPÉEN

44. McElroy, Gail. **Party switching in the European Parliament : why bother?** Marburg, Germany : European Consortium for Political Research, 2003. 31 p.
http://www.essex.ac.uk/ecpr/events/generalconference/marburg/papers/12/3/McElroy.pdf

« Current research suggests that party switching is not an uncommon occurrence in many political systems. This paper contributes to the emerging literature on this topic by analyzing patterns of party switching in the European Parliament (EP). What motivates so many deputies to switch political group in the EP? Studies of party switching in Japan, Italy, Brazil and Ecuador have suggested that the prospect of electoral advantage is significant in creating incentives for switching. The EP is a particularly interesting arena in which to study the phenomenon of party switching, as 1) the electoral incentives to defect are not obvious and 2) theories of switching which suggest that members defect to increase their access to pork have limited application. This paper tests the hypothesis that factors internal to the parliament are key in accounting for switches. Using an original dataset of party switchers and party, parliamentary and committee posts (covering the period 1989-1994) this paper uses a discrete choice model to test the hypothesis that MEPs switch political groups to advance their political careers within the Parliament itself. »

TRINIDAD

45. McClean, Hector. **Unenforceable floor-crossing legislation**. *Parliamentarian*. Vol. 78, no 4 (October 1997). P. 304-305

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